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Abstract. Trust and reputation are significant components in open dy-
namic systems for making informed and reliable decisions. State-of-the-
art trust models that exploit reputational evidence generally rely on re-
ports from as many sources as possible. Situations exist, however, where
seeking evidence from all possible sources is unrealistic. This is partic-
ularly the case in resource-constrained environments where querying in-
formation sources is costly, for instance in terms of time and bandwidth.
This paper describes an approach that exploits diversity among infor-
mation sources in order to select a small number of candidates to query
for reputational evidence. We demonstrate that reliable decisions can
be reached using evidence from small groups of individuals. We show
that our approach is robust in contexts of variable trust in reputational
sources and to a degree of deception.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial
Intelligence]: Multi-Agent Systems
General Terms: Experimentation, Performance
Keywords: Diversity, Reputation, Trust
1 Introduction
Reputation-based trust is a critical mechanism in large, open, and dynamic sys-
tems, where agents must interact with one another in order to achieve their
goals. Agents operating in such environments often rely on indirect experience
acquired from their peers in order to make informed decisions, especially when
direct experience on a subject is lacking or insufficient [10]. Whereas state-of-
the-art trust models exploiting this kind of evidence generally rely on reports
from as many sources as possible, in the physical world capturing and distribut-
ing evidence can be costly. For instance, in distributed environments such as
peer-to-peer networks, sensor networks, and pervasive computing, each partic-
ipant is responsible for collecting and combining evidence from others due to
lack of central authority or repository. A major constraint in such systems is
bandwidth, motivating the need to minimise the number of messages exchanged
in order to arrive at a decision. As a result, reputation assessments are often
based on a subset of evidence, usually from the agent’s neighbourhood [3], an
approach which in itself can be problematic, as it does not make use of all the
information available, and therefore is prone to biases and deception.
2 Reputation-based Trust Evaluations through Diversity
Motivated by this problem, we present an approach for minimising the costs
associated with making effective trust assessments, while still remaining robust
to biases and deception. In particular, we exploit diversity among information
sources to intelligently sample from the crowd of reputation sources. Our notion
of diversity is inspired by the work of Surowiecki et al. [8]. Their work highlights
some interesting criteria for effective decisions in large groups of individuals.
Diversity ensures that the experiences of different agents based on their private
information is exploited in a decision process. As agents most often operate in
social contexts where interaction with others is inevitable, so much could go to
influence their behaviour. Agent behaviour could be conditioned by organisation,
profession, or proximity to other agents in a network. While Surowiecki et al.
consider such effects detrimental to a decision process because of the possibilities
of collusive behaviour and subjectivity of opinions, we see great potential. For
example, where logical subgroups exist in the agent population as informed by a
feature-behaviour correlation, we can exploit this to limit the number of agents
queried for evidence. In the sections that follow, we demonstrate how this concept
can be employed in a manner that leads to positive outcomes.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 highlights the different
components of the diversity model. An evaluation of the approach is presented
in Section 3, and in Section 4 we conclude with a discussion and avenues for
future research.
2 The Diversity Model
The Diversity Model (DM) enables an agent to arrive at reliable decisions using
evidence from small groups of individuals. The model employs trust and machine
learning techniques in order to build models of information sources from which
potential candidates may be sampled for evidence.
We consider an evaluator x, who wishes to evaluate the truth of a proposition
ρ, and has access to a set of information sources A, where individual information
sources or agents are denoted x, y, ... ∈ A. The notation x will be used in the
course of this paper to denote an agent acting in the capacity of an evaluator,
while the notation y will be used to represent an agent regarded as an information
source. In a more general sense, an agent is regarded as a tuple 〈ID, F,R〉, where
ID denotes a unique identifier, F is a set of features, and R is a set of past
reports.
A report R, is an opinion about a subject ρ, provided by an agent y, to an
evaluator x, in response to a query. An agent y, records its perceived opinion
about ρ as Ry,ρ, and reports Ry→x,ρ when queried by x. The variable t denotes
a time step associated with a report from y, such that Rty,ρ represents a report
at time t. Consequently, Rt:t+ky→x,ρ denotes the set of reports received by x from y
between the interval t and t+ k.
Let F denote a finite set of features, such that f1, f2, ..., fd ∈ F . We define
a feature as an observable attribute of an agent, e.g., an agent’s organisation or
its location. An evaluator x, has a view on the relative importance of features
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represented by the vector 〈wx1 , wx2 , ..., wxd〉, where wxi is x’s view of the importance
of feature fi, and w
x
i :→ [0, 1]. Subsequently, an evaluator uses this metric to
compute the similarity between different agents. Similarity between agents is,
therefore, a measure of the distance between their features as informed by the
vector of weights on the features. We employ the weighted Euclidean distance to
compute similarity between any two agents y1 and y2 as:
DFy1,y2 = ‖y1 − y2‖ · F =
√√√√ |F |∑
k=1
wk
(
fky1 − fky2
)2
. (1)
2.1 Group
Let G denote a stratification on A, such that G = {Gi, Gj , ..., Gm} where
Gi
⋂
Gj = ∅, if i 6= j. We define a group Gi as a collection of homogenous
agents, such that {x : x ∈ Gi, Gi ∈ G} = A. Groups are formed subjectively by
an agent who attempts to disambiguate what metrics lead to a better stratifica-
tion of information sources. The group formation process is discussed in Section
2.3. However, the aim of an agent in partitioning the population, is to provide
a suitable generalisation of information sources using different distinguishing
characteristics. Subsequently, an agent exploits this model to limit the number
of sources queried for evidence, and to protect itself against deception. Agents
are partitioned into groups based on how similar they are to one another, as
specified by a similarity metric. We denote by Gi(y), an agent y’s membership
of a group Gi. An agent x, maintains two parameters δ
x
GFi
and δx
GBi
, which de-
note the feature-based similarity and the behaviour-based similarity of a group
respectively.
The feature similarity δx
GFi
of a group is the degree of similarity of members
of the group given their features. This parameter is measured by computing the
average weighted distance between pairs of agents in the group as follows:
δx
GFi
= 1− 2n(n−1)
∑
yp,yq∈Gi
DFyp,yq where p < q, and n = |Gi|. (2)
An evaluator learns over time the importance of different features while com-
puting similarity. Consider for instance, the following feature set 〈age, profes-
sion, location〉 describing agents in a population. An agent may assign different
weights to different features while measuring similarity. For example, an agent
could measure similarity using age, or location, a combination of age and loca-
tion, etc. Although different feature subsets may define different subgroups in the
population, not all feature subsets might be distinguishing enough for identifying
relevant subgroups in the population. In an example scenario, an agent wishing
to evaluate the reliability of a delivery company, may learn informing subgroups
in the population of reputation providers, by partitioning agents based on their
location for instance, rather than their age or profession. The fact that some lo-
cations may be easily accessible (e.g. metropolitan areas), than others (e.g. rural
areas), might impact on the satisfaction level of agents obtaining services from
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the company, and potentially reveal a relationship between the feature location
and the ratings obtained from agents.
The behaviour similarity of a group δx
GBi
, is a subjective measure of the like-
lihood of agents in the group behaving in a similar manner. In the context of
this paper, behaviour is represented by the report of agents. It is important to
emphasise here that behaviour similarity does not capture a semblance of the
agents based on their level of trustworthiness (e.g. honest, deceitful), rather it
is a measure of the consistency of agents in giving similar reports (be it honest
or deceptive ones), in response to the same query. Although agents belonging to
the same group may be regarded as having the same level of trustworthiness as
depicted in Section 2.2, in our model this condition alone does not satisfy the
criteria for grouping agents. It is possible for dissimilar agents to have similar
level of trustworthiness (e.g. agents from different but highly reputable organisa-
tions). In order to effectively exploit diversity in the system, our model requires
agents in a group to be similar both in feature and behaviour. To compute the
δx
GBi
of a group, a report matrix is constructed as illustrated in Figure 1. The
t1 t2 t3 t4
y1 1 5 1 4
y2 4 1 5 1
y3 1 5 2 4
Fig. 1. Report matrix for similarity calculation
matrix captures the rating provided by different agents in a given sampling inter-
val. A sampling interval is the time frame for which reports from different agents
are considered, and is the same for all the agents. In Figure 1 for example, the
sampling interval considered is t1 : t4 (i.e. t1, t2, t3,t4), and the reports from the
agents could be represented as Rt1:t4yi→x,ρ, i = 1, .., 3. Also, agents y1 and y3 with
report vectors 〈1, 5, 1, 4〉 and 〈1, 5, 2, 4〉 respectively, may be considered much
more similar to each other than agents y1 and y2 with report vectors 〈1, 5, 1, 4〉
and 〈4, 1, 5, 1〉 respectively. Details for the computation of this measure is given
in Equation 3 and Equation 4.
DRy1,y2 =
1
h
√∑
t∈h
(Rty1,ρ −Rty2,ρ)2, (3)
where h ∈ H represents the number of past reports taken into consideration.
Following Equation 3, δx
GBi
of a group Gi can be computed as:
δx
GBi
= 1− 2n(n−1)
∑
yp,yq∈Gi
DRyp,yq where p < q, and n = |Gi|. (4)
2.2 Group Trust and Subjective Logic
An evaluator depending on evidence from third party sources faces the risk of
misleading reports from these sources. Not all agents may act in a benevolent
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manner or even possess a required level of expertise to report on a subject.
Sometimes information sources may exaggerate perceived opinion, or offer tes-
timonies that are outrightly false. Finding ways to reduce the influence of mis-
leading reports from third-party sources is a fundamental problem in reputation
systems [10]. One way of mitigating against this problem, is maintaining a rep-
utation of the information sources, and using this to determine the weight given
to their reports [9].
Subjective Logic (SL) [1] is a belief calculus which allows agents to express
opinions as degrees of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty about propositions. Bi-
nary propositions, such as agent y, is trustworthy concerning ρ, lead to opinions
which are equivalent to a beta distribution. SL contains operations to represent
consensus, recommendation, and ordering, which are useful tools for evidence ag-
gregation. We adopt SL to represent trust because it provides an intuitive way
to represent the belief an entity has in another, and a way to aggregate evidence
to support such belief. An evaluator x’s opinion about an agent y, reporting
correctly on ρ is represented in Subjective Logic as a tuple:
ωxy:ρ = 〈bxy:ρ, dxy:ρ, uxy:ρ, axy:ρ〉
where bxy:ρ + d
x
y:ρ + u
x
y:ρ = 1, and b
x
y:ρ, d
x
y:ρ, u
x
y:ρ, a
x
y:ρ ∈ [0, 1]. (5)
In the above representation, bxy:ρ, d
x
y:ρ, u
x
y:ρ, a
x
y:ρ represent the degrees of be-
lief, disbelief, uncertainty, and the base rate (a priori probability in the absence
of evidence) respectively. Opinions are formed on the basis of positive and nega-
tive evidence. The variables rxy:ρ and s
x
y:ρ, represent the number of positive and
negative past observations of x about y respectively, and can be used by x to
obtain an opinion about y as follows:
bxy:ρ =
rxy:ρ
rxy:ρ + s
x
y:ρ + 2
, dxy:ρ =
sxy:ρ
rxy:ρ + s
x
y:ρ + 2
, bxy:ρ =
2
rxy:ρ + s
x
y:ρ + 2
(6)
An opinion’s probability expectation value computed using Equation 6, can be
used by x as a measure of y’s trustworthiness with respect to ρ.
τxy:ρ = b
x
y:ρ + a
x
y:ρ × uxy:ρ =
rxy:ρ + a
x
y:ρ + 2
rxy:ρ + s
x
y:ρ + 2
(7)
The base rate parameter axy:ρ, also known as the relative atomicity, represents
a priori degree of trust x has about y giving accurate report about ρ before any
evidence has been received. The parameter determines how uncertainty shall
contribute to the computed expectation value. The default value of axy:ρ is 0.5 [2],
which means that before any positive or negative evidence has been received,
both outcomes are considered equally likely.
The trust value for a group Gi is based on past interactions with members
of the group, and computed as a function of the trust of the individual members
encountered from the group.
τxGi:ρ =
∑
y∈Gi
τxy:ρ
|Gi| . (8)
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2.3 Learning Diversity
We define Diversity as a function ∆ : 2A → G that maps the feature set and
past reports (behaviour) of agents to a set of groups. We take as a working as-
sumption, that there may be some correlation between the features of an agent
and its behaviour. Where this exists, we could exploit information from observ-
able features of agents, as well as evidence from their past behaviour to build
a model of diversity. Diversity learning may be carried out in two stages: the
first stage involves an attempt at disambiguating what metrics lead to a better
stratification of the population of agents. The best metric in our estimation is
one that produces the highest feature-behaviour correlation, such that the prob-
ability of agents in the same group giving similar reports is maximized. We refer
to this correlation as group behaviour. In the second stage, the learned metric
is employed to partition agents into semi-homogenous subgroups. We focus here
on the process of group formation by assuming a learned metric.1 We employ a
clustering mechanism that incorporates a feature threshold fT, and a behaviour
threshold bT in order to control the formation of clusters. There are various
clustering techniques that can be used for this purpose. In this work, we employ
the hierarchical clustering [7] as an algorithm of choice because it is well-known,
and allows us to cluster into a set of groups the cardinality of which we do not
know in advance. The clustering process is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
In the first stage of the clustering, each agent is regarded as belonging to
a separate cluster, and the two clusters with the shortest 2-norm (Euclidean)
normalised feature distance are then merged to form a new cluster. In the second
stage, the merging of clusters continues as in the first stage, until either all the
agents are assigned to a single cluster, or the δx
GFi
of a potential group exceeds the
feature threshold fT. At each stage of clustering, the expected behaviour δx
GBi
,
of a potential group, is validated against the bT threshold based on available
evidence, to ensure the behaviour threshold is not exceeded.
Our clustering approach has some interesting characteristics. It imposes re-
striction on group membership for outlier agents. An outlier agent has features
matching that of a particular group, but with a non-conforming behaviour to the
group. Our model regards such agents as belonging to singleton groups pending
evidence suggesting otherwise. In line with this, unknown agents start off in sin-
gleton groups even though their features may be matched to any of the existing
groups, until there is sufficient evidence supporting their group membership.
2.4 Sampling and Evidence Aggregation
The DM model offers rich context from which an aggregation set may be derived.
In the general case, an aggregation set is made of candidates randomly selected
from different groups, from which evidence may be drawn in order to form an
opinion. However, depending on the specific requirements of a task, richer con-
texts could be explored using the learned model of diversity. For instance, the
cost and risk assessments of a potential transaction [4], may serve to inform the
1 Relaxing this assumption is left to a future work.
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Algorithm 1 Hierarchical clustering algorithm for group formation using feature and
behaviour criteria.
Require: A set of agents A
Require: A feature and behaviour based similarity thresholds, fT ,bT
Require: A feature and behaviour similarity functions, δGF ,δGB
1: allocate each agent in A as a single cluster
2: let C be the set of clusters
3: continue⇐ true
4: while continue do
5: continue⇐ false
6: for all X,Y ∈ C do
7: compute the between-cluster similarity δ
GF
(X,Y )
, such that δ
GB
(X,Y )
< bT
8: end for
9: if fT < δ
GF
(X,Y )
then
10: Z ⇐ X ∪ Y , where δ
GF
(X,Y )
is the minimum
11: remove Xand Y from C
12: C ⇐ C ∪ Z
13: continue⇐ true
14: end if
15: end while
16: return C
sampling process. Members in a group comprising of trustworthy agents may
be favoured, for example, over agents in less trustworthy groups in a high-risk
transaction. Also, in situations where the cost associated with sampling from
specific groups of agents (e.g. groups of experts) exceeds a budget, groups of less
knowledgeable agents may be considered, who in combination may provide a suf-
ficiently similar service. We consider the random selection of one representative
candidate from each of the groups to form an aggregation set. Provided the like-
lihood of agents in each of the groups behaving in a similar manner is relatively
high, then evidence from the set may be considered a sufficient representation
of the entire population. We do not suggest this to be the only approach for
sampling, but only that it demonstrates one possible realisation of our model,
which we have used in our evaluation. Other sophisticated sampling techniques
may be explored to meet specific requirements.
We denote by S the aggregation set comprising of candidates sampled from
groups in G. Gi,last is the number of agents in Gi. Further, we define Gi(l) as the
index of the lth element in Gi, for l = 1, ..., last. A candidate y ∈ Gi is selected
to be added to S, by choosing a random integer z ∈ [1, last].
The DM model does not limit the chances of unknown agents being sampled
by simply assigning them to an existing group having members with similar fea-
tures. Every unknown agent, as already mentioned is regarded as belonging to
its individual group, until there is sufficient evidence to classify it differently.
This approach prevents a stereotypical treatment for such agents with regards
to group membership, but gives each agent in this category a fair chance of be-
ing heard. There are benefits to this: in the first instance, a benevolent agent
sharing similar features with a group of malicious agents will not be automat-
ically labelled malicious, when there is no concrete evidence suggesting such.
Also, a group of benevolent agents will not risk the abuse of its reputation by
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malevolent agents who, for example, may be masquerading by presenting similar
features [6].
An evaluator x, combines reports from agents in the aggregation set S ⊆ A,
in order to arrive at an opinion about ρ. Every agent s, in the aggregation set,
has its report weighted by the subjective trust value τ , assigned its group Gi(s)
by x. We use an a priori trust for unknown agents which is often set at 0.5 in
literature [2]. The combined evidence is computed as:
Exρ =
∑
s∈S
Ry,ρ×τxGi(s):ρ∑
s∈S
τxGi(s):ρ
. (9)
3 Evaluation
In this section we describe experiments conducted to evaluate (in simulation)
the performance of the Diversity Model. The aim of the experiments is to study
the effect of group behaviour and deception on an aggregation result, and how
these mechanisms may be exploited to limit the number of agents queried for
evidence. We describe the methods adopted in the experiments, and present our
results and discussion. The factors taken into account in the evaluation are: the
predictive accuracy of the model to some ground truth, and the proportion of
agents in the population sampled for evidence. We compare our approach to
other approaches such as sampling the entire population of agents, randomly
sampling a number of agents, and sampling based on the trustworthiness of the
agents (in this instance we compare the performance of our model to the trust
computation engine used in Beta Reputation System [5]).
3.1 Experimental Setup
Our experiments are based on a simulation testbed which models a logical net-
work of agents as defined by their features. The environment consists of 100
sources and one evaluator. The evaluator relies on evidence obtained from the
sources to evaluate a subject of interest. Our network is connected, with undi-
rected edges from each node to its neighbours. The network fitness is based on
the distance between features of agents, such that nodes that are highly sim-
ilar gravitate towards each other. For simplicity, we assume that similarity is
defined on the same feature dimension for all agents. Agents possess incomplete
knowledge, and therefore, report with some amount of uncertainty. We simulate
this phenomenon by drawing each agent’s report from a Gaussian distribution
N(0, 1). However, agents closer to each other report in a similar manner. To sim-
ulate this we have each agent broadcast its report at each sampling phase to all
its one-hop neighbours. Each node maintains a buffer of reports received from its
neighbours. At each sampling phase, a node reports following N(0, 1). However,
if there are corresponding reports in a node’s buffer for the same sampling phase,
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a node alters its report to reflect a conformity to reports of its neighbours, with
only a slight deviation. In this way, we define the underlying logical network
we wish our evaluator to identify and exploit. The experimental parameters are
listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Experimental Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
#Information sources 100 # evaluators 1
feature threshold (fT ) 0.8 behaviour threshold (bT ) 0.9
degree of nodes 8 report distribution N(0, 1)
3.2 Experiments and Results
We consider different experimental conditions to analyse the effects of group be-
haviour and malicious agents on the aggregation result. We indicate the number
of agents used by our model in each case to arrive at a decision. Each evalua-
tion condition was initialised with random models of the information sources.
100 runs were conducted in 10 rounds for each case and the mean of the runs
reported.
Effect of Group Behaviour In this experiment, we analyse the effect of the
increasing rate of group behaviour in the population in the predictive accuracy of
the evaluator agent. In real world scenario, subgroups may arise, for instance, as
a result of agents having similar expertise, being constrained by organisational
policies, or by a coordinated act of collusion by different agents. This may be
regarded as a kind of deception, since agents exhibiting some of these traits may
not be reporting their perception objectively. We linearly increase the percentage
of conformity to group behaviour from 0% to 100%. In each case, agents that
conform to group behaviour are selected randomly from the population. Figure 2
shows the effect of group behaviour on the aggregated result. The deviation from
the ground truth is reported in each case. Although each agent reported with
some uncertainty, given incomplete knowledge on a subject the evaluator took
advantage of the large number of agents queried, and was able to make better
predictions because the noise in the aggregated reports cancelled out, leaving
only reliable reports. However, when the rate of group behaviour increased, as
expected, the reports also became skewed in favour of opinions held by different
subgroups, leading to lower accuracy in predictions. An evaluator in such cir-
cumstance may no longer benefit from sampling large number of agents, as each
new report may only be a repetition of an already sampled opinion.
In Figure 2, the performance of the DM model is compared against other
approaches. The metric we are specifically interested in is the performance of
our Diversity Model compared to other approaches. We considered an approach
based on sampling all agents in the population, which we refer to as the base-
line. Also considered are models based on the trustworthiness of agents, and
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the random selection of agents. The same number of agents as that sampled
by the DM model was employed to select agents when using the trust model
and the random selection respectively. The trust model involved sampling the
most trustworthy agents in the population. Our first observation is that all the
models begin very well when there were no group behaviour (at 0%). The pre-
dictions made were closer to the ground truth, with the baseline model slightly
outperforming the other approaches. Also nearly as many agents as the baseline
approach were queried by the DM model. This may be regarded as the worst
case, where no compelling evidence could be established for the formation of
informative groups. However, when evidence of group behaviour in the agent
population emerged, our model was able to exploit this to reduce the number
of agents queried, while still making better predictions. The performance of the
trust model was worse off, undoubtedly caused by the uncertainty in the reports
of the agents in each sampling phase. Specifically, when there were no expert or
malicious agents in the system, the trust model was unable to learn any useful
pattern in the reliability of agents, and therefore consistently made poor choices.
The approach based on random selection of sources is an uninformed selection
strategy, which leans much on chance. This, as observed is likely to perform
poorly in environments where there are defined patterns of behaviour among
agents. This observation is encouraging, as it demonstrates the efficacy of the
DM model in guiding decision making rather than relying on chance.
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Fig. 2. Effect of group behaviour in aggregated result
Effect of Malicious Sources Until now, we have discussed the scenario in
which agents reported objectively based on incomplete knowledge. However, in
real life settings, agents may not always behave benignly. There may be incentives
for agents to lie, leading to distorted reports aimed at subverting the system. In
this section we consider an attempt by malicious agents to systematically distort
the aggregation result, by reporting a value different from their observation.
Our goal was to determine robustness of our model with varying degrees of
deception. As before, we compare the performance of the Diversity Model against
the baseline approach, random selection, and trust filtering. The baseline, as in
previous case, involved sampling all the agents in the population.
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In the experiment, malicious agents report with a distribution that is different
from normal agents. Deceptive reports were drawn from a Gaussian distribution
N(2, 0.01), with an attempt at distorting the aggregation result. However normal
agents continued to report according to N(0, 1). We gradually increased the
percentage of deception in the system from 0 to 100, and observed the effect
when group behaviour was kept constant at 20% and 80%, respectively. In each
case, performance of the four approaches was considered, and the number of
agents queried at each instance was also recorded. The number of agents queried
by the diversity model in each case is captured in the result against the diversity
sampling curve, as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
An interesting observation, given this set of experiments is the notable im-
provement in the predictive accuracy of the trust model. Although still out-
performed by the Diversity Model, the trust approach performed significantly
better than the the baseline and random approaches. The trust model, in this
instance, was able to learn from its experience when the activity of malicious
agents became obvious and stable in the system. The effect of deception is all
the more highlighted and amplified in the system when considered in parallel
with group behaviour. An analogy of this could be drawn to agents in a social
network, where agents may be influenced based on the kind of social group they
belong to, or who they listen to. This kind of phenomenon is referred to as ru-
mour spreading in the literature [10]. As observed, the DM model could still
make better predictions because it was able to adjust the weights for different
types of sources.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a framework for selecting sources of reputational evidence, in
a way that guarantees reliable decisions from small groups of individuals. The
approach presented in this work is oriented towards resource-constrained envi-
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ronments where querying of information sources is costly. However, the proposed
approach could also be extended to other environments to facilitate selection of
interaction partners, and to guard against deception, especially the more coor-
dinated attempts of collusion. Where hidden networks defining group behaviour
exist in the population, our model is able to exploit this in order to limit the
number of information sources sampled while still remaining robust to decep-
tion. Where a na¨ıve approach of evidence aggregation would perform poorly
under these conditions, our model shows positive results that outperforms clas-
sical trust approach.
This work exploits features and perceived behaviour of agents in order to
cluster them into groups. We intend to exploit richer information contexts such
as domain ontology and provenance in future research in order to form better
clusters. For simplicity, this work assumes that malicious agents behave in a con-
sistent manner. We hope to incorporate more complex deception models in order
to evaluate robustness of our model in other scenarios. Although we considered
a very simple sampling mechanism for the selection of information sources, we
intend to incorporate richer sampling techniques, aimed at satisfying different
information needs of an application.
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